skills was produced largely by skill-biased technological change. Skill supply growth was due primarily to the rising educational attainment of successive cohorts. That, in turn, was fueled by increased access to public high schools and later to colleges and universities. The upshot of these changes was that the wage structure and educational wage differentials narrowed from 1915 to 1980, especially from 1915 to 1950. Relative demand shifts favoring more-educated workers have not been particularly rapid since 1980. Instead, the growth of the supply of skills slowed considerably after 1980 and the wage structure, in consequence, widened. The slowdown in the relative supply of skills of the working population came about largely from the slowdown in the growth in the educational attainment of U.S. natives for cohorts born since around 1950. In contrast, the increase in unskilled immigration accounts for only a small part of the slowdown skill supply growth.
Although the overall rate of relative demand shifts for more-skilled workers does not appear to have accelerated since 1980, computerization and international trade and offshoring have changed the nature of demand shifts. Skill-biased technological change has increased the relative demand for skill in a rather monotonic manner across most of the past century. But computerization, a recent form of skill-biased technological change, has increased the relative demand for skill in a non-monotonic manner. Computers strongly complement the non-routine or abstract tasks of high-wage jobs, but they directly substitute for the routine tasks in many traditional middle-wage jobs. However, computers have little impact on the non-routine manual tasks of many low-wage service jobs. Furthermore, this pattern of demand shifts appears to have been reinforced by international offshoring. The consequence of these changes is a polarization of labor demand that has led to rapidly growing inequality in top half of distribution with little or no change in inequality in the bottom half of the distribution.
I. The Evolution of the U.S. Wage Structure
Two large and representative household data sets have been widely used to document changes in the U.S. wage structure over recent decades. The March Current Population Survey (CPS) micro-data provide reasonably comparable information for the past four decades on (prior year's) earnings, weeks worked, and full-and part-time work status. We use the March files Individual-level data from the federal population censuses on labor market earnings for the previous calendar year, weeks and hours worked, and educational attainment allow us to track wage inequality and educational wage differentials since 1939. 7 Since no national sample exists giving all parts of the wage structure before 1939, we have pieced together data from various sources to track wage structure changes from 1890 to 1940. These sources include individual-level data on earnings and educational attainment from the 1915 Iowa state census, wage distributions for manufacturing industries for 1890 to the 1940s, and occupational wage series.
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A. Recent U.S. Wage Structure Changes 6 Our wage tabulations from the March CPS and CPS MORG files cover wage and salary workers aged 16 to 64 years and follow the data processing steps documented in the Data Appendix to Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) . Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the March CPS and CPS MORG samples for measuring changes in wage inequality. 7 Social Security Administration individual-level longitudinal annual earnings data starting in 1937 have recently become available, but these data do not include information on educational attainment or on weeks and hours worked. Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) use these data to examine inequality and mobility from 1937 to 2004. 8 See Goldin and Katz (2008) for the details on these data sets and on the wage structure from 1890 to 1940.
Wage inequality for hourly, weekly, and annual earnings has increased substantially since 1980 for men, for women, and for men and women combined. Rising wage inequality since 1980 was not offset, and actually appears to have been reinforced, by changes in non-wage benefits and workplace amenities. 10 Although transitory earnings variation increased in the 1980s, the bulk of the rise of cross-section wage inequality was driven by relatively permanent components of earnings variation including rising returns to education. 11 Earnings inequality expanded even more if one moves beyond standard household data sets and includes the better information on the top 1 percent of the annual earnings distribution from data on tax returns. 12 But large changes in the wage distribution for the bottom 99 percent group remain.
9 See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) , Katz and Autor (1999) , Lemieux (2006b Lemieux ( , 2007 , and Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007) for more comprehensive descriptions of recent U.S. wage structure changes. 10 See Hamermesh (1999) and Pierce (2001) . 11 See, for example, Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) . 12 See Piketty and Saez (2003, 2007) : the 90-10 overall log wage differential (for males), the 90-10 residual log wage differential (for males), and the college-high school log wage differential (for males and females combined). The three measures of inequality rose rapidly and in tandem during the 1980s and then grew more slowly (or flattened) in the 1990s and 2000s. But the college wage premium increased substantially in the 1960s when residual inequality was quiescent, and it declined in the 1970s when residual inequality increased (March CPS) or was flat (CPS MORG). Thus, the rise in wage inequality has not been a unitary phenomenon.
All three measures of hourly wage inequality from the CPS MORG display large increases in the first-part of the 1980s but, in contrast to the March CPS FTFY series, residual inequality stopped growing after the mid-1980s for hourly wages in the CPS MORG. The greater increase in wage inequality since the mid-1980s for full-time weekly wages in the March CPS than for hourly wages in the CPS MORG partly reflects an increasingly positive covariance of weekly hours and hourly wages even among full-time workers and likely reflects the growing importance of performance pay (such as annual bonuses), which is presumed to be better reported in the March CPS earnings measure.
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B. Divergent Upper-and Lower-Tail Wage Inequality
Underlying the rapid growth of overall wage inequality in the 1980s followed by deceleration in the 1990s is a divergence in inequality trends in the upper-half and bottom-half of 13 Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2007) document the rising incidence of performance pay and its role in rising wage inequality in the upper 20 percent of the wage distribution.
the wage distribution. The divergence is shown in Figure 3 , which compares the evolution of the 90-50 and 50-10 log hourly wage differentials for all workers across the past three decades. Overall earnings dispersion among manual workers in manufacturing, occupational wage differentials between skilled and less skilled manual workers, and white-collar to blue-collar wage differentials as well as the direct estimates of educational wage differentials in Figure 6 all show large declines from the early twentieth century to 1940. 21 We conclude that wage inequality and wage differentials by occupation and education shrank substantially during the first half of twentieth century.
20 See Katz (2000, 2008) on education returns, occupational wage differentials, and non-competing groups in the early twentieth century. Goldin and Katz (2008, The U.S. wage structure has followed the progression: narrowing to widening to polarizing. A substantial narrowing occurred from 1910 to 1950 and relative stability characterized the 1950s and 1960s. A sharp monotonic widening ensued in the 1980s and the wage structure has polarized since the late 1980s. Even though educational wage differentials and overall wage inequality do not always move closely together in the short run (such as during parts of the 1970s), changes in education returns have played a major role in declining wage inequality in the first half of the twentieth century and rising wage inequality over the last three decades. In fact, our estimates imply the majority of the increase in U.S. wage inequality since 1980 can be accounted for by increased returns to education (dominated by large increases in returns to college and post-college schooling). Thus, an understanding of the driving forces behind long-run changes in the educational wage differentials is essential to understanding recent U.S. wage structure changes.
II. The Race between the Supply of and Demand for Skills, 1915 to 2005
We model changes in educational wage differentials using the conceptual framework of a race between the supply of skills (driven by changes in the educational attainment of the work force) and the demand for skills (driven by skill-biased technological change). 22 We apply this approach to understand the evolution of the college wage premium from 1915 to 2005.
Our illustrative framework starts with a CES production function for aggregate output Q with two factors, skilled workers (S) and unskilled workers (
(1) 22 The notion that long-run changes in the wage structure are an outcome of a race between education and technology is further developed in Katz (2007, 2008) and dates back to Tinbergen (1974) and Freeman (1975) . We follow the specific analytical framework and empirical methods developed by Katz and Murphy (1992 α . We focus on the college/high school divide so that skilled workers (S) are "college equivalents" (college graduates plus half of those with some college) and unskilled workers (U) are "high school equivalents" (those with 12 or fewer years of schooling and half of those with some college).
Under the assumption that college and high school equivalents are paid their marginal products, we can use equation (1) to solve for the ratio of the marginal products of the two skill groups yielding a relationship between relative wages and relative skill supplies in t given by:
where t D depends on the skill-biased technological change parameters and indexes relative demand shifts favoring college equivalents and is measured in log quantity units. 23 The terms in brackets in equation (2) show how the evolution of the college wage premium depends on a race between the relative demand for and supply of skills. The aggregate elasticity of substitution between college and high school equivalents (σ SU ) is the key parameter determining how much changes in skill supplies affect the college wage premium. The greater is σ SU , the smaller is the
impact of shift in relative supplies on wages and the greater must be fluctuations in demand shifts ( t D ) for any given time series of relative wages to be consistent with a given time series of relative quantities.
How important have been skill supply and skill demand shifts in the evolution of the college wage premium series from 1915 to 2005 as shown in Figure 6 ? We directly measure the college wage premium and the relative supply of college equivalents, assume a plausible value for σ SU , and then use equation (2) to generate an implied time series of relative demand shifts
. A large literature using national time series data and regional panel data provides estimates of extended versions of equation (2) with demand shifts proxied by smooth time trends and cyclical variables or more direct measures of technology (capital-intensity) variables. These studies find strong negative impacts of the growth in college relative supply on the college wage premium and estimates of σ SU in the range of 1 to 2.5. 24 Our preferred model estimated on national data for 1914 to 2005 with demand shifts given by smooth time trends and an allowance for institutional wage-setting in the 1940s indicates that a 10 percent increase in relative skill supplies reduces the college wage premium by 6.1 percent implying σ SU = 1.64. 25 We also find little evidence that σ SU , measured in this manner, has changed much over the last century.
The large increase in the log college wage premium from 0.313 in 1950 to 0.618 in 2005 (see Figure 6 ) occurred at the same time the relative supply of college workers greatly increased.
The college graduate share of full-time equivalent employment increased from 7.8 percent in 1950 to 31.8 percent in 2005 and the college equivalent share increased from 12.4 percent to 24 Katz and Autor (1999) Furthermore, substantial indirect and direct evidence suggests skill-biased technological change has been the primary contributor to rising relative demand for skills. The relative employment of more-skilled workers has increased rapidly within detailed industries and individual establishments in recent decades despite sharp increases in their relative wages. 28 The adoption of new technologies (and associated organizational changes), more R&D, and greater capital-intensity of production have been strongly associated with a higher utilization of moreskilled workers in firms and industries. Evidence of technology-skill complementarity has been associated with the electrification of the factory in the early twentieth century and the introduction of computer-based technologies more recently.
29
Changes in the college wage premium and in the relative supply and demand for skilled (college equivalent) workers are given in Table 1 Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) , Juhn and Murphy (1995) . 28 See Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1997) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) . Foreign outsourcing of lessskilled jobs is another possible explanation for this pattern but large within-industry shifts towards more skilled workers have been pervasive even in sectors with little or no observed international trade or outsourcing activity. 29 See Katz (1998, 2008) on skill-biased technological change in the early twentieth century, Griliches (1969) on capital-skill complementarity in the mid-twentieth century, and Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) and Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) for more recent evidence on technology adoption and skill utilization. 30 We measure skill supplies in efficiency units taking into account systematic differences in productivity (wages) by age, sex, and education within each skill aggregate and adjusting for changes in the age-sex-education group composition of hours worked within each skill aggregate. A key message from Table 1 is that a sharp slowdown in skill supply growth rather than a persistent acceleration in demand growth has been the driving force behind the large rise in the 
where N j t ( M j t ) = supply of U.S. born (immigrant) workers in skill group j in year t and
The first term of the right side of the equation (3) is the native contribution to the log skill supply ratio. The second term, in brackets, is the immigrant contribution.
We use equation (2) to assess contributions of the U.S. born and immigrants to changes in skill supplies in columns (3) and (4) The differences in skill supply growth in the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries raise the question of whether we have reached an upper bound for educational attainment so that technology must race ahead of education and lead to further expansions in inequality. We do not think so. Other OECD nations currently have achieved far higher secondary school graduation rates than the United States and some have even passed us in four-year college completion rates. 36 Perhaps more convincing is that the returns to further educational investments continue 34 The methodology is analogous to that based on equation (3) for decomposing overall relative skill supply growth into immigrant and native-born components and uses data on skill supplies by single year of age birth cohorts. 35 See Katz (2007, 2008) for a supply-demand analysis of the high school graduate wage premium. 36 OECD (2006) The OECD data also indicate that U.S. is at about the OECD average for four-year college completion rates among young cohorts trailing 12 nations. 37 See Card (2001) and Oreopoulos (2007) . 38 See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2007) . 39 See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) . Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) extend the ALM framework and show that declining computer prices may initially lead to monotonically increasing shifts in skill demand (if low end routine tasks are easier to computerize than high end routine tasks) followed by non-monotonic shifts favoring the top and bottom at the expense of the middle of the wage distribution.
tasks") that comprised many middle-educated white collar and manufacturing production jobs.
Computerization has probably had little direct impact on the demand for the non-routine manual skills (called "manual tasks") used in many low-skilled service jobs (such as some health aides, security guards, and cleaners) and in many jobs in the building trades.
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The ALM framework suggests that computerization has led to changes in the organization of work that have raised the demand for higher-educated workers, depressed the demand for "middle-educated" workers, and left the lower echelons of the wage distribution, in 41 Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the mean gap in employment share growth rates between "college jobs" (those in the top half of the skill distribution) and "non-college jobs" (those in the bottom half) shrank from the 1980s to the 1990s in a manner consistent with the slowdown in relative demand growth for college equivalents from the 1980s to the 1990s found in Table 1 .
The computer task demand hypothesis also has implications concerning within-group shifts in skill demand and wage inequality by education group. Computers are strong complements to the abstract tasks of college graduates in top-end professional and management positions whereas they substitute for the routine tasks of lower-end college graduates in middle management and certain professional positions. Computers substitute for manufacturing production and administrative jobs often found in the upper-half of the non-college wage distribution, but have little direct impact on lower-end service jobs for non-college workers. The implication is that we should find strongly rising within-group wage inequality for college graduates since the late 1980s and possibly even declining within-group wage inequality for high school workers. In fact, that is exactly what is found in the CPS wage data.
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IV. Conclusions
The U.S. wage structure has evolved across the last century: narrowing from 1910 to 1950, relatively stable in the 1950s and 1960s, rapidly widening in a monotonic fashion during 41 For example, Juhn and Murphy (1995) examine the relative demand for occupation-industry cells (ranked by skill in terms of average wage percentiles) and find labor demand growth monotonically rising in skill for 1940 to 1980. 42 Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b) document rising within-group wage inequality for both male and female college graduates from 1988 to the early 2000s and little change or declining within-group wage inequality for high school workers over the same period.
the 1980s, and polarizing since the late 1980s. The majority of the large increase in U.S. wage inequality since 1980 is accounted for by expanded educational wage differentials dominated by sharply increased returns to post-secondary schooling. Rising wage inequality among the college educated is the other major contributor to recent increases in U.S. wage dispersion.
Skill-biased technological change has generated rapid secular growth in the relative demand for more-educated workers for at least the past century. But rapid increases in the supply of skills from rising educational attainment of the U.S. work force more than kept pace with relative skill demands for most of the twentieth century and served to reduce educational wage differentials and narrow the wage structure. A sharp decline in relative skill supply growth driven by a slowdown in the growth of the educational attainment of successive cohorts of the U.S. born has been the largest contributor to the surge in the college wage premium since 1980.
The economic returns to completing high school today appear substantial and the economic benefits to college and post-college schooling are at historically high levels. But the educational attainment of American youth is not rising as rapidly as it did over much of the twentieth century. Although college enrollment rates among new high school graduates have been rising since the early 1980s in response to high college returns, the traditionally-measured U.S. high school graduation rate (not including GEDs) has been stagnant for three decades and the share of young adults completing four-year college degrees has risen only modestly for post-1950 birth cohorts (especially for males). 43 After leading the world in education for most of the twentieth century, U.S. young adults are now in the middle of the pack in the OECD in terms of education attainment. 44 Expanding the educational attainment of U.S youth requires increasing 43 See Goldin and Katz (2008) for a detailed documentation and analysis of trends in U.S. high school graduation rates and in college enrollment and graduation rates as well as of policies to increase educational attainment. 44 The OECD (2006) reports that the United State ranked 11 th for males and 10 th for females out of 30 countries in its summary measure of educational attainment (mean years of schooling) for 25 to 34 year olds in 2004. the college readiness of children from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds and assuring the financial access to higher education of the college ready. 45 The polarization of the U.S. wage structure since the late 1980s has been accompanied by a polarization of employment growth. U.S. employment has bifurcated into high-wage and lowwage jobs at the expense of traditional middle class jobs. Changes in task demand from the adoption of computer-based technologies have been a major source of this shift in the pattern of skill demands. The growth of international offshoring is likely to have reinforced these changes in skill demands. A key uncertainty with respect to future U.S. wage structure developments concerns the longer run impacts on skill demands and worker bargaining power from increased international economic integration and greater offshoring opportunities. Top-end knowledge jobs are likely to benefit from growing international markets and foreign offshoring is unlikely to be able to substitute for in-person services and for construction jobs. 46 The returns to abstract skills from college and post-college training are likely to remain high and demands are likely to grow for interpersonal (soft) skills found in in-person services.
Our education system will need to be better positioned to produce individuals with abstract and interpersonal skills. A complementary approach would be to try "professionalize" the growing work force of in-person service workers and to develop labor market institutions to enhance the bargaining clout of such workers. Such policy changes are first steps toward
shifting America from its current path of increasingly "growing apart" back to a trajectory of shared prosperity. 
Notes:
The "relative wage" is the log (college/high school) wage differential, which is the college wage premium. The underlying college wage premium series is plotted in Figure 6 . The relative supply and demand measures are for college "equivalents" (college graduates plus half of those with some college) relative to high school "equivalents" (those with 12 or fewer years of schooling and half of those with some college). Relative skill supplies are measured in efficiency units. The native-born and immigrant relative supply columns decompose the overall relative skill supply growth into the native-born and immigrant contributions using equation (3) in the text. The log relative demand measure ( t D ) is based on equation (2) in the text and is given by
under the assumption that σ SU = 1.64. Tables, table F3 . The 90-10 residual log wage differential uses the wage residuals from separate regressions in each year of log wages on a full set of age and schooling dummies and interactions among the schooling dummies and a quartic in age. The college-high school log wage differential is a fixed-weighted average of the wage differential between those with at least a B.A. degree (16 or more years of schooling) to those with exactly a high school degree (12 years of schooling) estimated separately each year by sex for four different experience groups. 
Male Gini Coefficient:
The plotted series is the Gini coefficient for the annual earnings of male commerce and industry workers for 1937 to 2004 from the Social Security Administration earnings history data constructed and documented by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) and posted at http://www.columbia.edu/~wk2110/uncovering/. Table A8 .1 of Goldin and Katz (2008) .
College Graduate Wage Premium:
The plotted series is a weighted average of the estimated college (exactly 16 years of completed schooling or bachelor's degree) and post-college (17+ years of schooling or a post-baccalaureate degree) log wage premium relative to high school graduates (those with exactly 12 years of completed schooling or a high school diploma) for the year given. The weights are the employment shares of college and post-college workers in 1980. Notes: The figure plots the mean years of completed schooling by birth cohort adjusted to 30 years of age for the U.S. born. The log of the mean years of schooling for a birth cohort-year cell is the dependent variable in the age-adjustment regression that includes a full set of birthcohort dummies and a quartic in age as covariates. The age-adjustment regression is run on birth cohort-census year cells, pooling all the IPUMS for 1940 to 2000. The samples include all U.S. born residents aged 25 to 64 years. For further details on the method and data processing see Goldin and Katz (2008, figure 1 .4). .05
